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Abstract—Wireless covert channels promise to exfiltrate in-
formation with high bandwidth by circumventing traditional
access control mechanisms. Ideally, they are only accessible by
the intended recipient and—for regular system users/operators—
indistinguishable from normal operation. While a number of
theoretical and simulation studies exist in literature, the practical
aspects of WiFi covert channels are not well understood. Yet, it
is particularly the practical design and implementation aspect
of wireless systems that provides attackers with the latitude to
establish covert channels: the ability to operate under adverse
conditions and to tolerate a high amount of signal variations.
Moreover, covert physical receivers do not have to be addressed
within wireless frames, but can simply eavesdrop on the transmis-
sion. In this work, we analyze the possibilities to establish covert
channels in WiFi systems with emphasis on exploiting physical
layer characteristics. We discuss design alternatives for selected
covert channel approaches and study their feasibility in practice.
By means of an extensive performance analysis, we compare the
covert channel bandwidth. We further evaluate the possibility
of revealing the introduced covert channels based on different
detection capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless transmissions are broadly used, although properly
securing them remains an issue. Typically, applications resort-
ing to communications are protected by allowing information
leakage only to authorized channels such as data transmission
to permitted applications. Communication is often controlled
by firewalls. However, potential adversaries might outsmart
this protection and nevertheless leak information by setting
up a covert channel; hidden within inconspicuous actions. For
example, they could modify the application layer camouflaging
text within an image on a shared storage, or they could alter
the lower layers, e. g., within network protocols and timing.
When hiding information on upper layers only a few
variations such as using reserved bits or changing transmis-
sion timings are possible; since a firewall would easily any
other type of modification [23]. In contrast, physical wireless
transmissions are not plain bits but symbols containing a
high amount of noise and random signal variations. Snatching
raw data out of the air results in a very large amount of
data compared to upper layer capturing, still not revealing if
the recording contained hidden information or not. Regular
WiFi receivers are designed to reconstruct the signal despite
variations, hence their performance does not significantly
decrease when additional information is embedded. Due to
the wireless broadcast nature, frames can contain oblivious
sender and receiver addresses to not be suspicious to other
network participants—and still be received by attackers. For
∗ These authors contributed equally to this work.
instance, an online banking application could establish a secure
connection to a server but maliciously publish login data over
a covert wireless physical channel.
WiFi covert channels have been mostly studied in theory
and simulation [10]. Practical evaluations are scarce due to
the complexity of modifying existing network interface cards
(NICs), the work of Dutta et al. [6] being an exception.
We close this gap: in our work, we evaluate practical covert
channels on the Wireless Open-Access Research Platform
(WARP)[2] as well as off-the-shelf wireless NICs as legitimate
receivers. Using WARP, we are able to utilize the same
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modu-
lation schemes as in 802.11a/g. Our covert channels can be
easily adapted to OFDM-based wireless communication sys-
tems such as LTE, DVB-T, and upcoming standards like LTE
Advanced. We aim at remaining compatible with the 802.11a/g
standard and having little to no performance decrease on off-
the-shelf receivers. Our contributions are as follows:
1) We analyze the IEEE 802.11a/g physical layer with
respect to promising anchors for covert channels on
frame level and symbol level.
2) We propose, analyze, and practically implement two
novel covert channels. We study the performance in
simulation and practice.
3) We analyze and improve two known covert channels;
we practically implement them for the first time and
study the performance in simulation and practice.
4) We compare the performance of all four covert chan-
nels and discuss practical limitations.
This paper is structured as follows: We introduce concepts
behind WiFi covert channels in Section II. System and security
assumptions are defined in Section III. In Section IV, covert
channels and their performance in practice are analyzed. Sec-
tion V evaluates and discusses results. In Section VI we survey
related work. Finally, we conclude our results in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In the following, we introduce the concept of covert
channels and basic 802.11a/g physical layer operation.
A. Covert Channels
A first definition of covert channels is given in [15] with
a focus on information exchange between programs. Channels
are categorized as:
• legitimate: information required to manage the pro-
gram,
• storage: information provided to the program, how-
ever, attackers might have access to it, and
• covert: never intended for information exchange.
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The idea of covert channels is similar to that of steganography,
where messages are hidden within ordinary objects. In case
cryptography is forbidden within a network, covert channels
can be used to hide encrypted communication.
A covert channel consists of Alice, the sending attacker,
who wants to communicate with Bob, the receiving attacker,
while being observed by Wendy, a warden. Wendy’s legitimate
goal is to detect if Alice and Bob exchanged information. In
a wireless channel, positions of Alice, Bob, and Wendy are
arbitrary—Wendy might be closer to Alice than Bob. Alice
and Bob try to obscure the transmitted information to hinder
Wendy from detection. Alice will typically send legitimate
traffic to other stations and embed the covert channel. In
contrast, communication between Alice and Bob is obvious
in a cryptographic system and does not constitute an attack,
but Eve wants to illegitimately decipher their communication.
Covert channels are implementable with and without keys.
Kerckhoff’s law from cryptography is applicable to informa-
tion hiding: the system has to be secure when everything
except the key is public. Given this criteria, hiding information
by relying on an unknown embedding algorithm is insecure. A
wireless covert channel based on a public algorithm but private
key should be indistinguishable from noise. Covert channels
are often combined with cryptography to make information
look like noise or to add a further security measure.
B. OFDM
Physical layers of modern communication standards are
based on orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM).
To efficiently use the available transmission bandwidth while
still being able to correct channel distortions, the transmission
band is divided into subcarriers (SCs). On each of these subcar-
riers, symbols are transmitted by defining amplitude and phase
of the subcarrier frequencies for the duration of each symbol
Tsym. Limiting the length of each symbol leads to additional
frequency components in the form of sinc functions around
each subcarrier. To avoid inter-carrier interference (ICI), the
spacing ∆f = 1/Tsym ensures that each subcarrier is placed
on the zero-crossings of the sinc functions of all others, leading
to orthogonality. During transmission, the signal suffers from
frequency-selective phase and amplitude changes (fading),
that can be corrected at the receiver. However, fading also
implies a delay spread leading to the reception of multiple
time delayed copies of the transmitted signal. To avoid inter-
symbol interference (ISI), a guard interval is inserted between
two symbols, normally containing a continuation called cyclic
prefix (CP) of the symbol.
C. IEEE 802.11a/g physical layer
In the following, we take a closer look at the frame
structure as well as at the OFDM-based transceiver blocks
of 802.11a/g systems as illustrated in Figure 1. The presented
components are also required for more advanced standards.
For transmission, media access control (MAC) layer data
bits are scrambled to avoid consecutive ones or zeros, encoded
for bit error correction, and interleaved for distribution over
multiple subcarriers. This bit stream is mapped to symbols
describing amplitude and phase of their subcarrier. Depending
on the modulation order (bits per symbol) and the coding rate,
eight gross transfer rates between 6 and 54 Mbps are defined in
the WiFi standard [20]. In Figure 2, we illustrate the achievable
bit error rates (BERs) on a plain AWGN channel before and
after coding. The used modulation scheme is documented in
the signal field (SIG) that is always encoded with 6 Mbps.
Using the Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT), subcarri-
ers are modulated according to symbol definitions resulting in
a time-domain signal in the baseband. Before upconversion
to the transmission frequency, a preamble consisting of a
short training field (STF) and a long training field (LTF) is
prepended to every OFDM frame. A receiver needs the STF
to adjust the gain of its low-noise amplifier (LNA), and the LTF
to estimate and correct channel effects on each subcarrier. Due
to frequency differences in fc,tx and fc,rx as well as frequency
shifts due to the Doppler effect, carrier frequency offset (CFO)
occurs, which breaks the orthogonality between subcarriers
and hence requires correction. Coarse CFO correction makes
use of the repetitive structure of either STF or LTF, while fine
CFO correction uses pilot symbols that are transmitted on four
subcarriers of the OFDM data symbols.
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Fig. 2: BER baseline for WiFi frames before and after coding
on an AWGN channel with varying SNR
AGCLNA ADC SymbolTiming
Delete
CP FFT
H Estimate
Fine CFO
Symbol
Demap.
Bit Stream
Reconstr.
Raw
BER
Effective
BER
Data
DAC AddCP IFFT
Insert
Pilots
Symbol
Mapper
Bit Stream
Construct.
Data
exp(2pifc,rxt)
PA
exp(2pifc,txt)
Channel
H
STF
Level
Coarse
CFO
Insert
STF, LTF
TX
RX
...STF LTF
Fig. 1: 802.11a/g modulation and demodulation
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce a security model for wireless
covert channels and describe our measurement setup.
A. Security Model
To secure a system against covert channels, there are two
main procedures: either detecting or blocking them. Blocking
can be implemented by a wireless jammer [3], [21], though
jamming all wireless transmissions including legitimate ones
is not an option. Since there are no further processing steps
between sending and receiving a signal, there is no possi-
bility to filter signal variations for covert channel blocking.
Detecting covert channels to take further actions such as
jamming or sender identification does not prevent legitimate
wireless transmissions. Sending attackers could be identified
using localization methods or device fingerprinting; however,
fingerprints can be modified [17], and localization requires
multiple antennas.
A covert channel should be secure against detection, even
if the information hiding mechanism is known. Detection
security limits the capacity of covert channels. Legitimate
wireless transmissions containing a covert data have to be
indistinguishable from regular transmissions. Yet, the overall
wireless capacity is limited and a high capacity covert channel
might noticeably reduce legitimate throughput.
Layer 1 detection. On the physical layer, detection re-
quires software defined radios (SDRs) or signal analyzers to
capture the raw waveforms to measure error vector magnitudes
(EVMs), CFOs, and SNRs. A detector could compare these
measurements to a benchmark set of typical values in wireless
transmissions, and check which of them deviate significantly
from a certain margin of statistical tolerance. Hence, an
attacker should aim at keeping variations with respect to
the signal relatively low, and let them only be remarkable
in case a secret key is known, thus following Kerckhoff’s
principle; which is reducing the actual possible covert channel
throughput.
In this paper, we aim at showing the potential of practical
and 802.11a/g compliant covert channels. Providing an upper
bound of performance, we do not implement statistical detec-
tion countermeasures; however, we give some intuition into
how they work in each channel covert description.
Layer 2 detection. An upper layer detector is using off-
the-shelf wireless NICs. Even though this is not sufficient
equipment to record ongoing transmissions on the physi-
cal layer, information passed to upper layers might indicate
whether a covert channel is present.
Frames are validated on reception using the frame check
sequence (FCS) [20]. If it fails, the frame is dropped by
default. Higher layers can only rely on irregularities in timing
or throughput to detect covert channels. In our evaluation,
we enable the capture of those frames having failed FCS
checks using radiotap headers [1] to calculate actual BERs.
Radiotap headers are supported by various chipsets and for-
ward additional information, such as the transmission’s center
frequency, RF signal and noise power at the antenna, and the
FCS. Detectors can correlate all this information, for instance,
an increase of packet loss despite a constant RF signal power.
Still, radiotap headers do not provide the raw signal. Applying
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Fig. 3: Antenna setup for practical measurements.
Kerckhoff’s law, information passed to upper layers is often
insufficient for detecting high throughput covert channels.
B. Setup
We analyze the performance of covert channels in simula-
tion and practice using the following setups.
1) Simulation: We evaluate if the proposed covert channels
are feasible utilizing diverse channel models: A (no fading), B
(residential), D (typical office), and E (large office) defined in
[7] and commonly used for WiFi simulations. To each model,
we add white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and base our results
on 1000 Monte-Carlo simulations.
2) Practical Setup: Since simulations might disregard the
behavior of real hardware, we evaluate all covert channels
in our lab environment (see Figure 3). This evaluation is
twofold. We use WARPs to transmit and receive 802.11g
frames between Alice and Bob with covert channels. On the
receiver we can extract and analyze both, the WiFi frame
content and the covert channel. Hence, the WARP receiver
can be considered as detector (Wendy) on Layer 1 as well as
on the covert channel receiver (Bob). The signal processing
on both nodes is implemented in MATLAB which connects to
the WARPs using WARPLab 7.5.0.
To analyze the effect on off-the-shelf WiFi devices, we
use a laptop as detector (Wendy) on Layer 2 with a Qualcom
Atheros AR9285 Wireless Network Adapter (revision 01) that
we run in monitor mode with radiotap headers.
IV. COVERT CHANNELS
In what follows, we present four practical covert channels
for the physical layer of 802.11a/g.
1) A covert channel utilizing the Short Training Field in
combination with Phase Shift Keying (STF PSK).
2) A covert channel utilizing the Carrier Frequency
Offset with Frequency Shift Keying (CFO FSK).
3) A covert channel using 802.11a/g with additional
subcarriers conforming to the 802.11n spectrum mask
(Camouflage Subcarriers).
4) A covert channel replacing parts of the OFDM Cyclic
Prefix (Cyclic Prefix Replacement).
The schemes “STF PSK” and “CFO FSK” are new, “Cam-
ouflage Subcarriers” and “Cyclic Prefix Replacement” are
extensions and improvements to [11] and [10], respectively.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the approaches were
put into practice before.
A. Short Training Field with Phase Shift Keying (STF PSK)
Each 802.11a/g frame starts with the same STF in the
preamble, which is used for frame detection, automatic gain
control (AGC), and coarse CFO estimation. STF manipulations
must preserve these capabilities at the receiver, otherwise the
signal can not be demodulated. Implementing a covert channel
in the STF allows to insert one symbol per WiFi frame that is
impossible to block even after detection.
1) Implementation: The STF contains binary phase-shift
keying (BPSK) symbols that are shifted by 45◦ as illustrated
in Figure 4a. We insert our covert channel by introducing an
additional phase shift ∆φ into all STF symbols. As phase shifts
do not change the power and correlation properties of the STF,
it can still be used for AGC and packet detection. Additionally,
the periodicity required for CFO correction is preserved.
Per WiFi frame, we insert one phase shift. Depending on
the number of bits we intend to encode, we vary the number of
possible phase shift values mapped to bits using Gray coding.
To extract the covert channel information, the receiver needs
to compensate the channel effects in the STF using the LTF
channel estimation.
Then, ∆φ can be extracted and demapped to bits. In
Figure 4b, we illustrate this process with 32 possible phase
shifts (32-PSK illustrated by black dots). The red circles mark
the original STF symbol positions, and the cloud of blue dots
are the received STF symbols from which we extract the phase
difference to the original symbol positions.
2) Performance: Assuming we transmit WiFi frames with
STF phase shift keying (PSK) covert data over AWGN chan-
nels without fading, we can reach the BERs illustrated in
Figure 5. The more bits we encode in the STF, the smaller the
distance between the phase steps. This results in an increased
BER. For a typical 25 dB SNR, 6 covert bits per STF can be
hidden with less than 0.1% covert channel BER.
To evaluate the STF PSK performance in fading channels,
we perform simulations with channel models B, D, and E with
a fixed SNR of 25 dB introduced by AWGN. In Figure 6a, we
illustrate the results from 32-PSK (5 bits/symbol) to 256-PSK
(8 bits/symbol). We observe that transmissions up to 64-PSK
modulation are always error free, while higher modulation
orders result in more bit errors, especially when the effects
of fading increase. In our lab, we measure that all modulation
orders up to 128-PSK have low median error rates as illustrated
in Figure 6b. We conclude that one can transfer roughly 6 to
7 bits per frame with very low BER.
The achievable throughput of the covert channel strongly
depends on the number of WiFi frames transmitted per second.
For this scheme, short frames such as ACK and CTS (both
14 bytes long and sent at least at 36 Mbit/s) are ideal, since
one 4µs long OFDM-symbol sequence holds the complete
MAC layer payload. Note that increasing frame rates without
a plausible reason might help Wendy to detect information
exchanges. Combined with STF (4µs), LTF (8µs) and signal
field (4µs), the complete frame is 16µs long; resulting in a
gross frame rate of 62,500 frames/s. Using 64-PSK the STF
PSK covert channel achieves a gross bitrate of 375 kbit/s.
3) Detection: Layer 1. A physical layer detector needs
to perform the same steps as the covert channel receiver men-
tioned above. Those steps are not accomplished in regular WiFi
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Fig. 4: STF PSK symbols are shifted by ∆φ to encode bits.
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(a) Simulation with 24 Mbps WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
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(b) WARP-to-WARP measurement with 54 Mbps WiFi frames.
Fig. 6: BER of the STF PSK covert channel.
receivers and require a custom SDR-based implementation or
a spectrum/signal analyzer. To lower the detection probability,
a transmitter can map bits only to small phase changes, which
results in reduced covert channel throughput. As the secret
information is already transmitted before it can be detected, a
wireless jammer cannot be used to block the covert channel
transmission without destroying every WiFi frame.
Layer 2. As mentioned above, a phase shift in the STF
does not influence the functionality of the STF at the receiver.
To verify this, we compared BERs of received WiFi frames
with and without covert channel and were not able to dis-
tinguish between them. Neither in simulation, nor in practice
when receiving with a WARP or off-the-shelf WiFi card.
B. Carrier Frequency Offset with Frequency Shift Keying
(CFO FSK)
A WiFi baseband signal is upconverted to the carrier fre-
quency fc with fc,tx ≈ fc and downconverted using fc,rx ≈ fc
(see Figure 7). Their difference results in CFO, which needs to
be corrected, together with additional CFO due to the Doppler
effect. WiFi receivers are capable of correcting CFOs by
tracking the pilots that are inserted into each OFDM symbol.
We introduce an artificial fCFO at the transmitter as covert
channel. Regular WiFi receivers silently correct fCFO, while
covert channel receivers can extract the hidden information.
1) Implementation: To encode bits, the transmitter maps
them to the two frequencies ±∆CFO, each with a symbol length
of an OFDM symbol (4µs). The resulting complex waveform
is multiplied with the time-domain signal of the WiFi frames
in the baseband. This shifts each OFDM symbol by ±∆CFO
in the frequency-domain, depending on the encoded bit.
A covert channel receiver estimates the phase shifts of
the pilot symbols for each OFDM symbol, as illustrated in
Figure 8. The covert CFO changes are superimposed by an
additional slowly varying CFO. To extract bits despite further
CFO components, the receiver first lowpass filters the CFO
estimate and uses it as a threshold for a hard decision decoder.
The six outer bits on both sides are discarded as they contain
many bit errors. The lowpass filter is implemented as 20-tap
finite impulse response (FIR) filter, which requires at least 60
OFDM symbols to work correctly.
2) Performance: In the simulations we add a fixed 50 kHz
CFO for both AWGN and fading channels as well as a 15 Hz
maximum Doppler spread for the fading channels B, D, and E,
representing environmental movement. The resulting AWGN
covert rates for different ∆CFO values in Figure 9 show that
stronger CFO changes enhance the covert channel. As illus-
trated in Figure 10, stronger multipath effects lead to higher
covert BERs. Especially in the model E, a ∆CFO of more than
10 kHz is required to keep the BERs low. In WARP-to-WARP
measurements with 54 Mbps WiFi frames, for ∆CFO=1 kHz,
the average covert BER is 15%—for ∆CFO ≥5 kHz no errors
occur, which is comparable to the AWGN simulation results.
The BERs of the WiFi frames in both simulation (Fig-
ure 11a) and practice (Figure 11b) show that—up to 10 kHz
∆CFO—there is almost no increase in the BERs at the detector.
To avoid detection, the lowest working ∆CFO should be chosen,
which is 5 kHz in our lab. By encoding 1 bit per 4µs OFDM
symbol, the covert throughput is 250 kbit/s.
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Fig. 10: CFO FSK covert channel simulation with 24 Mbps
WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
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(a) Simulation with 24 Mbps WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
WARP raw BER WARP eff. BER WiFi eff. BER
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
no
co
ve
rt
ch
an
ne
l
1
kH
z
5
kH
z
10
kH
z
20
kH
z
Fr
am
e
B
E
R
(b) WARP-to-WARP/Laptop 54 Mbps legitimate receiver.
Fig. 11: CFO FSK BER at the legitimate receiver.
3) Detection: Layer 1. Every WiFi receiver estimates and
corrects CFOs. However, those measurements are normally
directly discarded during signal processing. As shown in
Figure 8, receivers capable of analyzing CFO changes over
time can directly detect the binary pattern. Using lower ∆CFO
values hardens detection but increases error probabilities on
the covert channel.
Layer 2. Our simulated and practical results in Figure 11
show that large CFO changes drastically increase BERs in
all channel models. However, in our setup 5 kHz ∆CFO is
sufficient for covert transmissions without increasing errors
in the WiFi frame reception. Furthermore, ∆CFO could slowly
be increased to stealthily reach a working point to prevent
detectable sudden BER changes. Hence, CFO frequency shift
keying (FSK) can be undetectable on Layer 2, if configured
carefully.
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Fig. 7: We introduce artificial CFO fCFO
into each OFDM symbol in the baseband.
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C. Camouflage Subcarriers
The camouflage subcarrier covert channel hides informa-
tion in subcarriers used in other protocol variants. In 802.11a/g,
52 subcarriers are used for 48 data and 4 pilot transmis-
sions, while 802.11n utilizes 56 subcarriers in the same band.
The additional 4 subcarriers can be utilized in 802.11a/g
transmissions as covert channel. At plain sight the spectra
look like valid 802.11n frames (as depicted in Figure 12). A
regular 802.11a/g/n WiFi receiver does not sense the number
of used subcarriers, but only checks the signal field at the
beginning frame and continues decoding according to the
802.11a/g standard, simply ignoring camouflage subcarriers.
Using additional subcarriers was proposed in [11], yet, without
the constraint to mimic another protocol version.
1) Implementation: We replace the 802.11a/g LTF with
the 802.11n HT-LTF, which is still correlating with the LTF,
thus allowing a proper timing synchronization at the receiver.
Additionally, the covert receiver can estimate the channel
effects of the camouflage subcarriers.
2) Performance: When comparing Figure 13 to Figure 2,
it is obvious that the covert subcarriers perform very similar
to the normal subcarriers. Depending on channel effects and
output filters, it might happen that the outer subcarriers have a
slightly different performance, though. Covert subcarrier per-
formance for different channel models is depicted in Figure 14.
Assuming camouflage and normal subcarrier performance are
similar, the covert channel performance is 8.3 % of the normal
channel throughput.
In our experiments, we vary the rate of the camouflage sub-
carriers, while keeping the rate of the regular WiFi data fixed.
Figure 14 compares simulation results of camouflage subcar-
riers. Experimental results are not illustrated—the WARP-to-
WARP channel in our lab is quite good and no errors occur
in the camouflage subcarriers for all modulation orders.
3) Detection: Layer 1. A Layer 1 detector that can decode
the signal field is able to determine if the number of subcarriers
within the signal is correct. However, only checking the
spectrum will not reveal the covert channel, as it is still valid
and conforms to the standard 802.11n.
Layer 2. A Layer 2 detector has insufficient information
since neither normal subcarrier performance decreases nor
interference with neighboring channels occurs. Even further
subcarriers can be used to increase covert channel throughput
as long as the neighboring channels do not overlap, but this
could be easily detected on Layer 1. Our results show that
adding camouflage subcarriers does neither increase BERs in
simulation nor in practice.
D. Cyclic Prefix Replacement
Multipath effects and timing offsets during demodulation
cause overlapping OFDM symbol parts, called inter-symbol in-
terference (ISI). In 802.11a/g, a cyclic prefix (CP) is prepended
to symbols in order to reduce ISI. At reception, this CP is not
decoded. Nevertheless, the CP might still be larger than the
actual ISI and, hence, can be used as a covert channel.
A simulation in [10] replaces the complete CP with
covert symbols. This results in a normal channel with up
to 54 Mbit/s according to 802.11a/g and an additional covert
channel achieving 13.5 Mbit/s, since the CP length is 1/4 of the
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Fig. 14: BER of covert camouflage subcarriers in simulation
with 24 Mbps WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
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normal symbol. The channel performs well as the simulations
are limited to AWGN channels with neither fading nor ISI.
Hence, the CP is not required at all. In practice, we could not
reproduce such optimistic results.
1) Implementation: There are basically two ways of em-
bedding data in the CP. In the first approach, four CPs are
combined to obtain a symbol of regular length. In a practical
channel instead of the AWGN channel proposed in [10],
fading effects disturb samples near to concatenation points.
A solution is shown in Figure 15a, where the covert symbols
are distributed to multiple CPs with some overlapping samples.
First simulation results, however, show that more concatena-
tions lead to more disturbances (e.g. due to the Doppler effect)
making this approach impractical.
The second approach decreases the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) size to a maximum of the actual CP length, automat-
ically leading to less subcarriers as depicted in Figure 15b.
Even though only 1/4 of the subcarriers are used in a 16-
point FFT compared to the normal symbol’s 64-point FFT,
12 symbols are usable by replacing the full CP. Using four
CPs, 48 symbols can be used for data transmission—analogous
to the first approach. To reduce the ISI with regular OFDM
symbols, the covert channel FFT size can be reduced to 8,
4, or 2 at the cost of covert throughput. Prepending a CP to
the covert channel in the CP (called CPCP) even removes ISI
inside the covert channel. In our experiments, we add a CPCP
of 2 samples to the 1/2 CP replacement scheme.
2) Performance: The performance of the CP replacement
covert channel is very high. Figure 16 compares BERs for
different CP replacement strategies in an AWGN channel. Re-
placing shorter parts of the CP results in more errors. Adding a
CPCP does not help in an AWGN channel because the channel
does not introduce ISI. In contrast, in the multipath channel
simulations illustrated in Figure 17a, the CPCP significantly
decreases the covert channel BERs. In our lab environment,
the CPCP is required and very effective: it reduces the BER to
0% as shown in Figure 17b. Depending on the actual amount
of multipath effects, a higher CPCP length is reasonable.
Throughput of full CP replacement is 25 % of the cor-
responding WiFi frame throughput, if multipath effects are
neglected. For 1/2 CP replacement, the maximum throughput
is reduced to 12.5% of the WiFi frame throughput. Hence,
even with the CPCP improvement for less transmission errors,
this covert channel has good performance.
3) Detection: Layer 1. A physical layer detector can
compare the last 16 samples of an OFDM symbol with its
cyclic prefix, which should be similar except for ISI damage.
Replacing parts of the original CP slightly increases out-of-
band emissions that might be visible in a spectrum analyzer—
but they are still within the spectral mask (see Figure 19).
Layer 2. Since the CP is removed before further processing
on Layer 2, the only visible effect is an increased BER in rich
multipath environments. A Layer 2 detector cannot measure
the actual channel coefficients and thus, cannot distinguish
whether a high BER is caused by a covert channel or not.
As expected, in the multipath channels the legitimate BER
significantly increases at complete CP replacement. However,
we could not measure negative effects of 1/2 CP replacement
for channel models B, and D, as our results in Figure 18a
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(a) Simulation with 24 Mbps WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
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(b) WARP-to-WARP measurement with 54 Mbps WiFi frames.
Fig. 17: BER of covert CP replacement.
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(a) Simulation with 24 Mbps WiFi frames (SNR = 25 dB).
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(b) WARP-to-WARP/Laptop measurement with 54 Mbps WiFi
frames.
Fig. 18: BER of WiFi frames with CP replacement at legiti-
mate receivers.
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Fig. 19: The spectrum of CP Replacement frames has higher
out-of-band transmissions than regular frames.
show. In the practical measurements in Figure 18b, only a full
CP replacement has a negative effect on bit errors, especially
when using off-the-shelf NICs. Hence, attackers should replace
less than 1/2 CP in typical environments to avoid detection.
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
Next, we compare results and discuss the pros and cons of
the investigated covert channels, summarized in Table I.
All covert channels introduced in this paper can be com-
bined. Since they modify different parts of OFDM symbols,
the overall performance when enabling all covert channels at
once is their cumulative performance. This comes at the cost
of an increased detectability, see subsection V-B on how to
lower detectability. If detected, Wendy either tries to decode
the covert channel or to block it, for example, using a wireless
firewall such as WiFire [21]. The STF PSK covert channel is
special, because even in case of detection it cannot be blocked.
A. Covert Channel Performance
A fair comparison of the covert channels is demanding,
since they behave differently depending on the channel models,
legitimate traffic, etc. The simulated AWGN channel is overly
optimistic compared to our lab setup, while channel model B is
rather similar to our lab setup and yields comparable perfor-
mance for the covert channels. Hence, we present empirical
results for our lab measurements with a raw BER of 0.1%,
which can easily be corrected with basic coding schemes.
Simulated channels D and E include effects not observable
in our lab, hence yielding significantly harsher conditions for
both covert and legitimate channel.
Some covert channel rates are frame-based while others
are symbol-based. Depending on this, either the maximum
or minimum frame size is optimal to increase performance.
The minimum frame size is 14 bytes for clear to send (CTS)
and ACK frames. Data frames can have a maximum frame
size of up to 2338 bytes, assuming an unencrypted 802.11a/g
data frame consisting of a MAC header (typically 30 bytes), a
MAC service data unit (MSDU) (0-2304 bytes), and a FCS (4
bytes) [20]. Delays between frames depend on contention in
the MAC layer and on frame types, hence we omit them in our
exemplary calculation in Table I—as they are omitted when
claiming an 802.11a/g maximum gross data rate of 54 Mbit/s.
Choosing minimum or maximum frame size on Layer 2 might
be suspicious to attackers, thus this is only a reference for the
STF CFO CS CP
Layer 1 spectrum n n y/n y (p)
Layer 1 constellations y (p) y (p) n y
Layer 1 decoding n n y y
Layer 2 BER n y (p) n y (p)
TABLE II: Detectability comparison: detectable (y),
not detectable (n), detectability/performance trade-off (p).
optimal case. For low detection probability, the covert channel
should be embedded in everyday network traffic.
B. Detection Probability
Table II summarizes a comparison of the detectability of
all the proposed covert channels. Detectability is subject to the
choice of the covert channel parameters; configuring the covert
channel for lower throughput can facilitate to evade detection.
Layer 1. A Layer 1 detector might take a look at the
spectrum and IQ constellation diagrams with a spectrum/signal
analyzer. In case the Layer 1 detector must compare properties
in the time domain, a SDR supported analysis is optimal.
In the spectrum, CP replacement is visible since it intro-
duces distortions into the CP, which violate a smooth signal
continuation in it. camouflage subcarriers can be detected, but
since their spectrum is valid for 802.11n, the signal field has
to be decoded to identify the frame type.
When analyzing IQ constellations per symbol, all covert
channels can be detected. However, camouflage subcarriers can
only be identified as such if the signal field is decoded and
checked. CP replacement is visible in the symbols after cutting
off the CP, when Wendy is in a multipath-rich environment.
Detection probability for STF PSK and CFO FSK can be
lowered by reducing ∆Φ, respectively ∆CFO.
Layer 2 A Layer 2 detector can only see an increasing
BER: if the covert channel is switched on and off immediately,
BER changes are visible on Layer 2. Hence, STF PSK and
camouflage subcarriers, which do not increase the normal
channel BER, are not detectable on Layer 2. To reduce the
detection probability of CFO FSK, reducing ∆CFO helps.
Replacing shorter parts of the CP helps to diminish distortions
in multipath-rich environments leading to lower overall BERs.
VI. RELATED WORK
The idea of hiding information in wireless network traffic
is not new. Most schemes are designed for the data link
layer or higher, using reserved fields, time delays, or packet
corruptions. An approach for transmitting data in corrupted
frames was first proposed in [18]; cryptographic information
identifying corrupted frames is exchanged in advance using
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) cipher initialization vectors
(IVs) and MAC addresses. WEP IVs are implemented in [8],
but without making covert data match the same probability
distribution as IVs. In [16], reserved fields are proposed for
802.15.4 covert channels. An 802.11 MAC layer analysis
on campus traffic in [12] evaluated utilizable fields due to
randomness and high occurrence, proposing the Frame Control
Covert Channel Section Conclusion
STF PSK Sec. IV-A Introduces phase shift to STF; immune to reactive jamming; no influence on WiFi BER; 1 PSK symbol per frame; max.
covert rate 375 kBit/s for 64-PSK
CFO FSK Sec. IV-B Introduces artificial CFO; tunable for no influence on Wifi BER; 1 bit per OFDM symbol; max. covert rate 250 kBit/s for
5 kHz FSK
Camouflage
Subcarriers
Sec. IV-C Uses four additional subcarriers from 802.11n; no influence on WiFi BER; 4 QAM symbols per OFDM symbol; max. covert
rate 4.5 Mbit/s for 54 Mbit/s WiFi frames.
Cyclic Prefix
Replacement
Sec. IV-D (Partial) replacement of the cyclic prefix; no influence on WiFi BER in line-of-sight channels, but affected by multiplath
effects; 12 (full CP rep.)/6 (half CP rep.) QAM symbols per OFDM symbol; max. covert rate 6.75 Mbit/s for 1/2 CP with
CPCP
TABLE I: Summary of the analyzed covert channels. The exemplary performance values use our lab setup. Covert and
legitimate channel have a median raw BER of below 0.1% and use optimal settings for the covert channel.
Field (FCF) More Frag, Retry, PwrMgt, More Data as well as
the 802.11 header fields Duration/ID and FCS. In [13], timings
of Retry bits indicating retransmissions are used to encode
information. Hiding wireless access points by swapping fields
with an Atheros and madwifi-ng is realized in [5].
Wireless physical layer covert channels are rare, but they
are more generic. Hence, related work in this area is not
only on 802.11g but on OFDM based systems in general. In
[11], the usage of additional subcarriers in LTE and WiMAX
is evaluated in simulation. The model assumes that covert
sender and normal sender are different identities, therefore
their timing offset impacts subcarrier orthogonality. 802.11n
physical layer steganography using the CP is proposed in [10].
In a simple AWGN based simulation, they archive a data rate
as high as 1/4 of the normal channel without degradation.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one wireless
physical layer covert channel that was put into practice: dirty
IQ constellations for 802.11a/g [6]. The authors define four
IQ constellations in addition to the four raw QPSK points.
This way, they can reach up to the same covert throughput
as normal throughput. To circumvent detection, they modified
constellations to use a Gaussian distribution, and compared
them to regular noisy signals. However, when we tried to
reproduce their results including the obfuscation mechanism,
we had to cope with a high amount of bit errors, especially in
more complex channel models.
A related topic to covert channels is watermarking of
signals, allowing for identification and authorization on a phys-
ical layer basis. For this, an authentication tag is embedded.
In [19], cognitive radio primary users add phase noise to
QPSK symbols to authenticate themselves while maintaining
backward compatibility to secondary users who are not aware
of this scheme. A similar scheme for a non-return-to-zero
encoding is proposed in [14] by embedding authentication tags
in redundant information reducing ISI. A fingerprint can also
be added to the channel state before sending, assuming only
small channel changes between transmissions, users knowing
the previous channel state can extract the fingerprint [9]. The
QPSK scheme is secured against user emulation attacks in
[4] by adapting the phase distortion to the current SNR.
However, all these schemes were only verified in simulations.
A practical implementation adding further IQ constellations as
in [6] without Gaussian distribution is shown in [22].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that physical layer WiFi covert
channels are feasible in practice. We design novel covert
channels and improve known ones. Our work is—to the best of
our knowledge—the first one to characterize various OFDM-
based covert channels in practical settings. Based on our
results, we discuss pros and cons of the covert channels with
respect to their performance as well as their detectability. With
this, we provide a first compendium for practical physical layer
WiFi covert channels, which facilitates the understanding of
this potential attack vector.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the
Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 1053 “MAKI – Multi-Mechanism-Adaptation for
the Future Internet” and by LOEWE CASED. We thank Halis Altug, Athiona Xhoga and
Stephan Pfistner for the implementation of the first prototypes.
REFERENCES
[1] Radiotap. radiotap.org.
[2] WARP project. warpproject.org.
[3] E. Bayraktaroglu, C. King, X. Liu, G. Noubir, R. Rajaraman, and
B. Thapa. Performance of IEEE 802.11 under jamming. Mobile
Networks and Applications, 18(5):678–696, 2013.
[4] K. M. Borle, B. Chen, and W. Du. A physical layer authentication
scheme for countering primary user emulation attack. In International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
pages 2935–2939. IEEE, 2013.
[5] L. Butti and F. Veysset. Wi-Fi Advanced Stealth. Proceedings Black
Hat US, Aug 2006.
[6] A. Dutta, D. Saha, D. Grunwald, and D. Sicker. Secret agent radio:
Covert communication through dirty constellations. In M. Kirchner and
D. Ghosal, editors, Information Hiding, volume 7692 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 160–175. Springer, 2013.
[7] V. Erceg et al. TGn channel models. IEEE 802.11-03/940r4, 2004.
[8] L. Frikha and Z. Trabelsi. A new covert channel in WiFi networks. In
Third International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and
Systems (CRiSIS), pages 255–260, Oct 2008.
[9] N. Goergen, W. S. Lin, K. R. Liu, and T. C. Clancy. Authen-
ticating MIMO transmissions using channel-like fingerprinting. In
Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM), pages 1–6.
IEEE, 2010.
[10] S. Grabski and K. Szczypiorski. Steganography in OFDM symbols
of fast IEEE 802.11n networks. In Security and Privacy Workshops
(SPW), pages 158–164. IEEE, 2013.
[11] Z. Hijaz and V. Frost. Exploiting OFDM systems for covert commu-
nication. In Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), pages
2149–2155, Oct 2010.
[12] C. Kra¨tzer, J. Dittmann, A. Lang, and T. Ku¨hne. WLAN steganography:
a first practical review. In Proceedings of the 8th workshop on
Multimedia and security, pages 17–22. ACM, 2006.
[13] C. Kra¨tzer, J. Dittmann, and R. Merkel. WLAN steganography revisited.
In Electronic Imaging, pages 681903–681903. International Society for
Optics and Photonics, 2008.
[14] V. Kumar, J.-M. Park, T. C. Clancy, and K. Bian. PHY-layer authenti-
cation using hierarchical modulation and duobinary signaling. In Inter-
national Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications
(ICNC), pages 782–786. IEEE, 2014.
[15] B. W. Lampson. A note on the confinement problem. Commun. ACM,
16(10):613–615, Oct 1973.
[16] D. Martins and H. Guyennet. Attacks with steganography in PHY and
MAC layers of 802.15.4 protocol. In Fifth International Conference on
Systems and Networks Communications (ICSNC), pages 31–36, Aug
2010.
[17] S. U. Rehman, K. W. Sowerby, and C. Coghill. Analysis of imperson-
ation attacks on systems using RF fingerprinting and low-end receivers.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 80(3):591 – 601, 2014.
Special Issue on Wireless Network Intrusion.
[18] K. Szczypiorski. HICCUPS: hidden communication system for cor-
rupted networks. In International Multi-Conference on Advanced
Computer Systems, pages 31–40, 2003.
[19] X. Tan, K. Borle, W. Du, and B. Chen. Cryptographic link signatures
for spectrum usage authentication in cognitive radio. In Proceedings of
the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security, pages 79–90.
ACM, 2011.
[20] The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. IEEE standard
802.11-2012. IEEE Standard for Information technology, 2012.
[21] M. Wilhelm, I. Martinovic, J. B. Schmitt, and V. Lenders. WiFire: a
firewall for wireless networks. In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2011.
[22] P. L. Yu, J. S. Baras, and B. M. Sadler. Physical-layer authentication.
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 3(1):38–51, 2008.
[23] S. Zander, G. Armitage, and P. Branch. A survey of covert channels and
countermeasures in computer network protocols. IEEE Communications
Surveys Tutorials, 9(3):44–57, Third 2007.
